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Policy Directions to Mitigate Water-Supply Risk 
 in Irrigated Agriculture:  A Federal Perspective 
 
Across river basins of the western U.S., emerging water demands for out-of-stream uses and in-
stream needs have intensified competition for freshwater resources.  Much of this water can only 
be obtained through conservation and reallocation of existing supplies as opportunities for large-
scale water-supply development are increasingly limited.  Irrigated agriculture, accounting for 
over 90 percent of consumptive water use in the West, will likely be the primary source of water 
targeted for reallocation. 
 
In many cases, new water demands have been driven by Congressional mandates and trust 
responsibilities of the Federal government.  In water-short years, managers of heavily-
appropriated water-supply systems have had to reallocate limited supplies to meet required 
Federal purposes such as endangered species protection.  Of concern to water users is the 
potential reach of Federal actions that restrict access to irrigation water supplies and the 
accompanying losses to agricultural producers in the absence of compensation.   
 
A recent example of Federal water-supply restrictions to agriculture involved the Klamath River 
Basin.  In 2001, following a prolonged period of drought, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and 
National Marine Fisheries Service ruled that lake-storage drawdown and low streamflows 
jeopardized endangered and threatened fish.  The joint rulings required the Bureau of 
Reclamation to restrict irrigation water deliveries on 220,000 acres over much of the growing 
season, which had a significant impact on agricultural production in the region.  Local farmers 
claimed that the Federal action had resulted in economic damages and an undermining of water   2
rights.  Damages were eventually addressed through ad hoc disaster payments of roughly $30 
million to affected producers, with an additional $50 million earmarked under the Farm Bill 
appropriations for agricultural and environmental needs.  The Klamath case has raised questions 
as yet to be resolved regarding Federal water-supply reallocations, the process of compensating 
irrigators, and the appropriate use of taxpayer resources. 
 
This paper reviews the issue of water reallocation from a Federal perspective.  While water 
allocations are governed primarily by State water law and institutions, the Federal perspective is 
relevant given that Federally-financed water supplies (Bureau of Reclamation) are often the 
supplies most likely to be reallocated, Federal agency actions are often the impetus for 
reallocation, and Federal programs are usually called on to provide compensation.  The paper 
opens with observations on the potential economic loss to agriculture from water-supply 
reductions and a brief review of Federal water authorities as policy context for Federal actions.  
The balance of the paper presents a comparative review of alternative policy instruments that 
have been proposed, and implemented in some cases, to mitigate and/or compensate losses 
resulting from Federal water-supply restrictions.    
 
Potential Agricultural Losses due to Water-Supply Restrictions  
 
Irrigation is a defining feature of crop production in the American West and an increasingly 
important element of crop production in the eastern U.S.  According to the 1997 Census of 
Agriculture (USDA, 1999), 55.0 million acres of agricultural land were irrigated nationally 
(about 16 percent of cropped acres).  The 19 Western states account for 78 percent (43 million   3
acres) of total irrigated cropland and pastureland, with the remaining 22 percent (12 million 
acres) in 31 Eastern states. 
 
The value of crop sales is a measure of the importance of irrigation water to the farm sector and 
rural areas.  In the Western states, the 1997 Census reported 142 million acres of harvested 
cropland with total crop sales of $45 billion.  Irrigated crops accounted for 27 percent of the 
area, but produced 72 percent of the total value of crop sales in the region.  Total sales of 
irrigated crops in the West—$32 billion in 1997—accounted for roughly one-third of all U.S. 
crop sales.  Crop sales per harvested acre in the West averaged $850 for irrigated cropland, 
compared with $122 for non-irrigated cropland.  Irrigated crop sales were led by high-valued 
orchards, vegetables, and nursery crops, while irrigated cropland area was dominated by grain 
and forage crops. 
 
The Federal government, through the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), serves as a 
water ‘wholesaler’ for 9.1 million acres, or more than 20 percent of the West’s irrigated acres—
collecting, storing, and conveying water to local irrigation districts and incorporated mutual 
water companies that, in turn, serve about 140,000 irrigators.  Roughly 4 million acres are totally 
dependent on Reclamation for their irrigation water supply.  Approximately 4.7 million acres 
utilize a combination of Reclamation-supplied water and other surface-water sources, while 0.4 
million acres utilize Reclamation water in combination with groundwater sources.   
 
The reallocation of regional surface water supplies due to competing water demands may reduce 
or alter agricultural activity in some regions, particularly in water-short years.  This is especially   4
the case in areas of the West, where the extent and value of irrigated production is high and 
secondary water sources may be limited.  Reclamation water supplies are potentially the most 
affected by Federal decisions that limit water withdrawals. 
 
In on-going research at the Economic Research Service assessing the potential costs of water-
supply interruptions, we estimate the impact of a curtailment of Reclamation supplies on 
producer income and potential compensation costs.  Impacts reflect a short-run analysis which 
assumes that the crop has been planted, that production costs associated with land preparation 
and planting have been incurred, and that water deliveries are stopped with no opportunity to 
adjust production decisions.  Thus, reported costs and returns reflect maximum potential values 
for a given reduction in agricultural water supply.
1 
 
Acreage and cost impacts were estimated under a range of hypothetical reductions in 
Reclamation water deliveries.  A 20-percent reduction in Reclamation deliveries westwide, for 
example, would affect up to 15.4 percent of total irrigated acres in the 17 Western states, 
resulting in an estimated decline in farm revenue of up to $1.26 billion, or 2.7 percent of total 
returns to irrigated crop production.  The decline in crop production expenses associated with 
ceasing irrigation exceeds the rise in production expenses from increased livestock feed 
purchases, resulting in a net decrease in regional farm production expenses.  The combined 
effect of reduced farm revenue and net reduction in production costs results in a decline in net 
returns to management, operator labor and invested capital of $1.05 billion. 
                                                           
1 In this analysis, we did not allow for potential onfarm production adjustments to mitigate producer losses.  Net 
returns are computed based on a fixed-acreage adjustment, with total crop loss assumed over the share of acreage 
impacted.  Thus, maximum revenue losses for water-supply reductions reported here may substantially overstate 
actual producer losses, especially where supply restrictions are known in advance and are more limited in scale.   
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Agricultural damages from a given reduction in surface water supply would vary significantly 
across river basins of the West.  Regional variability reflects the nature of irrigated crop 
production, local reliance on surface water supplies, and the share of surface water supplied by 
Reclamation.  In general, states in the Pacific and Mountain region have the largest share of 
Reclamation-supplied areas, and are most significantly affected by restrictions on Reclamation 
water.  The Plains states are more dependent upon groundwater, and are likely less affected by 
Federal restrictions on water withdrawals.  
 
Damages would also depend importantly on the nature of the water-supply restriction, including 
the severity and duration of the supply interruption, the timing of the interruption within the 
season, and whether the interruption was anticipated.  Producer adaptation may help to mitigate 
some portion of losses.  Prior knowledge of water-supply reductions allows crop choice, 
cropping practice, and acreage planted decisions to be adjusted to more closely match the 
projected water supply.  Producers can also seek alternative water sources, either surface water 
from producers not affected by the Federal action or private groundwater supplies.  Potential for 
mitigation is greatest where the water-supply interruption is anticipated, partial and small in 
scale, and timed to occur prior to crop planting or late in the growing season.   
 
Finally, the extent of damage depends critically on how this reallocation is achieved.  The non-
market-based institutions that underlie most current water allocation systems may preclude 
current water users from obtaining the full value of their current water rights in the event that 
supplies are reallocated.  As a result, there is growing pressure to compensate current water right   6
holders (usually farmers) for water supplies reallocated.  The magnitude of agricultural income 
losses, and costs to Federal and local governments, will depend on how water transfer systems 
evolve and whether and how current users are compensated for losses.    
 
Federal Role in Water-Supply Reallocation and Compensation 
 
Federal authority for water resources was established in early legislation designed to promote 
economic development through Federal reclamation, hydropower and navigation programs.  
More recently, the focus on large-scale capital construction projects has given way to multi-
objective management of river ecosystems, with greater emphasis on Federal trust 
responsibilities and environmental concerns.  The evolving Federal role—and the inevitable 
conflicts with established water rights under state law—continue to play out in river basins 
across the West.   
 
Congressional mandates and legal statutes over the past century have substantially redefined the 
scope and responsibilities of Federal agencies in the management of river systems.  Increasingly, 
Federal actions have prompted reallocation of water supplies—primarily from agriculture—to 
meet Federal obligations for endangered species protection, water quality, trust responsibilities, 
and other purposes.  Based on an assessment of water conflicts in the West as part of the ongoing 
ERS research project, it is entirely plausible, if not likely, that reallocation of existing 
agricultural supplies will continue in response to increasing water demands, due in part to 
Federal actions designed to meet human health, trust responsibilities and other public-interest 
goals.    7
 
While future Federal reallocations will likely occur, the location, timing, magnitude, and purpose 
of potential Federal water reallocations are unknown and cannot readily be predicted.  The 
probability that future Federal actions will restrict irrigation withdrawals in any particular basin 
depends on many factors including: weather factors relating to drought; the capacity of water 
storage systems, future water demands; the flexibility of legal institutions in accommodating 
water-supply shortfalls; and the extent and nature of Federal interests in the basin.   
 
The rationale for compensation of producer losses due to risk of Federal actions will depend in 
part on whether the Federal reallocation is unanticipated and non-permanent or longterm and 
permanent in nature.  Federal water decisions associated with endangered species protection, for 
example, may occur unexpectedly.  Unanticipated weather may lead to species threats which 
must be addressed immediately, increasing the uncertainty of irrigation supplies.  However, 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) restrictions will most likely coincide with natural drought events, 
making it difficult to distinguish drought impacts from the effect of Federal actions in assessing 
potential compensation costs.  In contrast, changes in water allocations associated with the 
settlement of Native American water rights or other Federal Reserved rights may not pose as 
serious a ‘single-year’ compensation issue because such water reallocations are generally known 
prior to crop planting.  However, basin reallocations to meet these claims can have broader 
implications for risk in irrigated production.  Affected basins may be more vulnerable to water 
shortages as competing demands for water expand, reducing the dependability of agricultural 
water supplies and increasing the likelihood of Federal and State actions in water-short years.
2 
                                                           
2 In the case of compensation for foregone returns due to a permanent water loss, the decline in asset values may   8
 
While Federal water-resource agencies and authorities have reallocated water supplies to meet 
changing needs, the Federal role in providing compensation is unclear, with compensation levels 
undetermined.  USDA provides crop insurance and non-insured crop assistance to reduce income 
losses due to weather-related crop failure and other factors. This coverage, however, has not 
been extended to losses resulting from restrictions on irrigation water supplies.  The potential 
impact on agriculture has prompted considerable policy interest in both the reach of Federal 
agencies and the effectiveness of alternative strategies to protect irrigators against financial 
damage. 
 
Potential Policies to Mitigate Water Interruption Losses 
 
Various policies have been proposed to mitigate agricultural losses from water-supply 
reductions.  These include more traditional methods (crop insurance and direct payments), new 
financial instruments (revenue bonds), conservation initiatives, and resource market options 
(land buyouts, water banks, and contingent water markets).  Policy measures differ in the level of 
compensation provided, capacity to address concerns of direct and indirect stakeholders, 
required institutional modifications, reliance on Federal outlays, and impact on production and 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
be a more appropriate measure of compensation than estimates of annual income loss.    9
Insurance Mechanisms 
 
Both the costs and consequences of providing insurance to farmers who face the risk of losing 
their water supplies due to reallocation will depend in part on the insurance strategy or 
mechanism employed.  Possible insurance mechanisms include subsidized insurance (similar to, 
or an adaptation of, the crop insurance program already employed by USDA’s Risk Management 
Agency (RMA) for weather-related yield and price risks), direct compensation (akin to disaster 
assistance), and market-based insurer tools such as tradable contingent bonds.   
 
Crop insurance and non-insured crop assistance are currently the most widely accepted means of 
mitigating risk of loss in agricultural income.  Extension of insurance and crop assistance 
measures to Federal water-supply restrictions would require clarification of the nature of Federal 
actions that result in eligible damages and the degree of compensation awarded.  Insurance 
premiums would be difficult to assess, given that the probabilities of water-supply restrictions 
are not known and not readily quantified.  There is a fundamental difference between insuring 
against natural events and those induced by policy decisions.  In addition, Federal outlays may 
be substantial depending on the nature and extent of the water-supply restriction and the degree 
of compensation required. 
 
Subsidized Crop Insurance:  RMA currently offers a suite of insurance contracts that provide 
indemnity payments in the event of particularly low yields and/or prices.  The current provisions, 
however, do not cover yield losses that stem from the cancellation or reallocation of irrigation   10
water supplies, including Federally-supplied water.  Moreover, insurance coverage is available 
only for certain crops.   
 
One means of insuring farmers against water-shortage risk would be to alter the current 
insurance program so as to include coverage of potential losses stemming from actions that 
restrict water allocations.  In principle, this approach could only require a slight revision of the 
current provisions.  While superficially appealing, adjusting the current program may also entail 
substantial difficulties, unintended consequences, and institutional and administrative costs.   
 
First, unlike weather-related price and yield variation, there exist no historical data that could be 
used to systematically estimate the likelihood of mandatory water reallocation.  Under the 
current agreement between the Federal government and private insurance agencies, insurance 
companies pay a portion of the indemnities and retain a portion of the premiums.  If the 
probability and potential damages of Federal water reallocations cannot be assessed in a reliable 
manner it would be difficult, if not infeasible, to calculate new premiums that satisfy both the 
government and private insurance companies.   
 
Second, if farmers are insured against downside losses in the event of water reallocations, they 
may choose to plant crops that would not normally be profitable but with higher loss potential 
under water-supply restrictions.  If farmers do not pay the actuarially fair premium for such 
potential losses, then altered cropping patterns of this kind could be very costly to the 
government.   
   11
Catastrophic Coverage and Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance:  Under a combination of the 
Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program (NAP) and the minimal crop insurance program, 
farmers can obtain “catastrophic coverage” that only insures weather-related losses greater than 
50 percent of expected yield at 55% of the average market price.  Participating farms can obtain 
this coverage for just $100 per county and crop insured, regardless of how many acres a farmer 
insures in a given county.  Like the “full” crop insurance program, coverage for NAP or 
catastrophic crop insurance does not currently extend to losses that stem from a reallocation of 
water.  An expansion of these programs to cover water shortfalls could entail an ambiguous and 
potentially large growth in government expenditures, while compensating farmers for a 
relatively small share of the per-acre losses that stem from water reallocations.   
 
Direct Compensation:  Congress may choose to compensate farmers in an ad hoc fashion in the 
event of water reallocations, as it occasionally does in response to certain weather-related losses.  
Direct payments have similar properties of moral hazard as insurance, except farmers pay no 
premiums, and have no assurance of compensation in the event of loss.  The potentially high cost 
associated with direct compensation/disaster relief has provided the incentive for consideration 
of alternative compensation schemes.   
 
Tradable Contingent Bonds:  Rather than provide individual insurance contracts or direct 
payments to farmers, the government might insure farmers through an auction of tradable bonds 
that pay a predetermined value in the event of Federally-imposed, water-supply restrictions.  For 
example, suppose the government wishes to provide a total of $1 million in insurance coverage 
against possible losses with a potential reallocation of water in a particular region over the next   12
ten years.  To achieve this objective, an Agency could auction a thousand $1000 bonds, each of 
which pays the face value in the event water is reallocated.  The competitive price of the bonds, 
determined via auction, is the conceptual equivalent of the premium paid in insurance contracts.  
The number of bonds a farmer chooses to purchase would determine his or her level of coverage.  
If a farmer later wishes to change coverage levels due to a change in crops, prices, or growing 
practices, the farmer can do so by buying (or selling bonds) from (to) other farmers. 
 
Unlike crop insurance or direct payments, tradable contingent bonds do not give farmers an 
incentive to alter their production artificially in order to take advantage of the program.  Further, 
the compensation costs of water reallocation would be known to the government in advance—
the amount would equal the face value of bonds issued. 
 
The non-distortionary nature of tradable contingent bonds constitutes a potential benefit of this 
approach.  Another benefit is that a bond market would preclude administrative costs associated 
with determining premiums and selling individualized insurance contracts.  Furthermore, farmers 
indirectly affected by water reallocations could also insure themselves.  For example, farmers 
down-slope from farmers who irrigate with Federal water may benefit indirectly to the extent 
that up-slope irrigation replenishes down-slope supplies.  Down-slope farmers could also 
purchase bonds to insure themselves against potential losses.  Similarly, input suppliers, local 
agricultural interests, and other interested parties who indirectly hold personal stakes in water 
allocations could also insure themselves.   
   13
Government officials may also choose to allocate some or all of the bonds (rather than sell them 
via auction), perhaps according to farmers’ current water rights.  However, an allocated bond 
distribution would increase net costs to the government, and require an appropriate initial 
allocation of the tradable bonds. 
 
Agricultural Water Conservation Policies 
 
Production adjustments to conserve water supplies at the farm level may help to mitigate the 
effect of cutbacks in irrigation water deliveries.  The extent to which these measures can offset 
producer losses will depend on many factors, including the nature and timing of the water-supply 
restriction, the crops produced on the farm, the farm technology and resource base, hydrologic 
conditions in the basin, and state regulations governing water conservation. 
 
Agricultural water conservation can be achieved through several means.  Producers may reduce 
per acre water use for a given crop through deficit irrigation, shifting to alternative crops or 
lower-yielding varieties of the same crop that use less water, or adopting more efficient irrigation 
technologies and water-management practices.  In some cases, producers may convert from 
irrigated to dryland farming or retire land from production.  Deficit irrigation—knowingly 
applying less than full crop-consumptive requirements and accepting the corresponding yield 
loss—may be an option in areas where the loss in irrigated yield is low relative to the value of 
water saved.  Deficit irrigation can be an effective potential producer response where water 
restrictions are imposed later in the crop season, particularly for drought tolerant crops and other 
perennial crops and pasture under moderately arid conditions.   14
 
The ability to substitute crops is an important response to water shortfalls that are known prior to 
the planting season.  Wide variation in irrigated crop sales values (USDA, 2003) provides 
significant flexibility for irrigated agriculture to adjust to changes in water availability through 
cropping adjustments.  Farmers may also adjust to water shortages by growing less water-
intensive crops, thus extending limited water supplies over a greater area. 
 
Many irrigators have responded to water scarcity through the use of improved irrigation 
technologies—often in combination with other water-conserving strategies—and irrigators will 
likely look to technology as one of several means of conserving water in the future.  Improved 
water management practices may also be required to achieve the efficiency potential of the 
physical system.  Providing incentives to farmers to adopt more efficient irrigation systems is a 
common policy proposal for augmenting scarce water supplies in the West.  The Federal 
government supports improved technology adoption through cost-sharing under the 
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and other initiatives.  
 
Improved irrigation and water conveyance technologies that increase onfarm water-use 
efficiency can have potential benefits for water conservation, water quality and farm returns.  
However, the extent to which technology adoption can achieve significant water savings for in-
stream uses will depend on many factors, including levels of efficiency improvement, the 
disposition of irrigation losses and return flows, and changes in crop consumptive use, both on-
farm and downstream (Aillery and Gollehon, 2000).  Improving irrigation technology alone may 
not achieve the desired reduction in agricultural water use and increase in streamflow, without   15
accompanying reductions in crop consumptive use and irretrievable system losses.  The 
effectiveness of on-farm water conservation policies to offset reductions in water supplies cannot 
be easily generalized without regard to hydrologic conditions, water diversion rights, and policy 
objectives in the basin.  If the policy goal is to ensure sufficient water for in-stream 
environmental uses, an effective conservation program will likely require water-right reforms 
and regulations to ensure allocation of conserved water for the desired purpose (Schaible and 




Market-based measures have been proposed, and implemented in some areas, to facilitate 
transfers of water supplies during water-short periods.  Market-based policies can involve 
irrigators as both buyers and sellers of water supplies, as well as Federal/State governments and 
environmental organizations, depending on the structure of the market mechanism.  Currently 
there is wide variability in water market development, ranging from no market access to 
advanced, computer managed local markets.  Water markets have been limited by state and other 
institutional requirements, infrastructure needs, and the third party impacts of transfers.  Markets 
may be an attractive option for meeting in-stream flow needs because the infrastructure 
requirements are often very modest.   
 
As market measures enable irrigators to monetize the value of their water resource, these 
measures may be an effective means of mitigating the risk of water-supply restrictions to the 
extent that producers are fully compensated, Federal budget exposure is limited, and resource-  16
use efficiency is enhanced.  Market strategies can help to distribute the potential costs of water 
reallocations among States and water recipients, while more effectively allocating water to meet 
in-stream requirements and higher-valued water withdrawals.  However, fully operational 
markets may require legal and institutional reforms and additional storage/conveyance 
infrastructure to facilitate water transfers. 
 
Buyouts:  Rather than compensate farmers for “losses” associated with a reallocation of water, 
the government might purchase farmers’ water rights prior to, or at the time of a water shortfall.  
Buyouts of farmland and irrigation water rights may be highly effective in redirecting water flow 
to a desired target, while compensating farmers for foregone crop returns.   
 
Unfortunately, there are associated problems.  First, water savings from a buyout program may 
be intercepted by other users with an unsatisfied water allocation.  This can be a significant issue 
during drought conditions when downstream irrigators facing water shortages are restricted from 
diverting from water courses flowing with ‘buyout water’ intended for instream use.  Second, 
proposed buyout programs generally rely on the Federal government for financing.  For example, 
one recent Congressional proposal [H.R.5698 §3(g)(1)] called for the Federal government to 
finance up to 75 percent of buyout costs.  Third, permanent buyout policies often are politically 
infeasible because of concerns by local communities and politicians that the buyouts would have 
disastrous impacts on regional agricultural employment, farm-related businesses, and local tax 
bases (Hymon, 2002).  Consequently, although many farmers may be willing sellers, local 
agribusiness and community interests may actively work against buyout policies.  For example, a 
proposal formulated by conservation and agricultural groups was dropped in the Klamath Basin,   17
even though 24 farm families controlling 30,000 acres were offering to sell land and associated 
water (ONRC, 2001). 
 
Water Banks:  Water banks have been established by several states to promote more efficient 
water distribution during severe droughts.  Water banks are designed to facilitate the temporary 
reallocation of water among interested parties by lowering the transaction costs of effecting 
water transfers.  For example, the California Department of Water Resources (DWR) operated 
Drought Water Banks in 1991 and 1992 (Howitt, 1994; Israel and Lund, 1995).  The banks 
served as a broker for water transfers by drafting both purchasing and sales contracts and 
coordinating the transfers.   
 
Water banks facilitate compensated, voluntary water transfers by providing a legal system of 
trading at a fixed rate, thus lowering information costs and other transaction costs for the 
contracting parties.  The degree to which State water banks can be used to increase in-stream 
flows for other uses depends on State water law.  Unfortunately, existing State laws and 
regulations may create severe impediments and disincentives to sell banked water for 
nonagricultural purposes (Huffaker, Whittlesey, and Wandschneider, 1993).  Fixed payments per 
unit-water may inhibit participation from some buyers and sellers, and water banks alone may 
not be able to target flow augmentation to problem stream reaches.  An additional problem 
attending all water transfers: the transferred water would need to be protected against further 
appropriation by downstream irrigators who would otherwise use the increased flows. 
   18
Contingent Water Leases:  Contingent water leases belong to a group of specialized water 
transfers recommended by some economists to limit the extent and duration of the negative 
economic impacts that permanent transfers may have on local communities and water users not 
party to the trade (Huffaker and Whittlesey, 2000).  Of this group, contingent water leases 
(transfers that occur intermittently and are triggered only by some predetermined contingency) 
offer the most secure water supply to environmental and urban uses because they can be 
triggered automatically by critically low-water years.  
 
Specifically, contingent leases operate via an “option contract,” that gives the buyer temporary 
use of the water whenever a given contingency occurs (such as a drought).  The seller (e.g., the 
farmer) retains ownership of the water right and receives his/her normal water supply during 
years when the option is not exercised.  When the option is exercised, the seller leases to the 
buyer (e.g., another farmer, municipality, hydroelectric utility, environmental organization) a 
given portion of water under their water right for a specified period of time.  Both parties benefit: 
the buyer obtains a more secure water supply during the contingency, and the farmer-seller is 
paid for the option and maintains secure long-term water supplies that allow for continued 
operation and long-term financing.  This market-based option also protects the long-term 
agricultural base of local communities.  The water transferred under the lease is temporary and 
thus potential injuries to local communities are short-lived.   
 
A strong argument can be made in favor of contingency contracts and other market-based 
mechanisms to reallocate water among current and proposed uses, as demand for these uses 
adjusts under changing water-supply conditions.  Operational water markets would allow   19
farmers and other interests to insure themselves against uncertain deliveries (due to weather or 
other water restrictions on agricultural and non-agricultural users), providing compensation to 
those with historical ownership of water rights, while at the same time improving resource use 
efficiency.  Implementing full-functioning water markets, however, would need to address major 
physical and institutional hurdles in many areas.  State water laws and Federal project-level 
administrative procedures would need to adapt to allow for water market transfers by: (1) 
allowing private parties or downstream communities to lease water rights for in-stream flow 
augmentation; (2) relaxing restrictions and disincentives impeding water transfers in general; (3) 
better protecting in-stream flows from unauthorized diversions, and (4) explicit consideration of 
the interests of indirect stakeholders in current water allocations.  The physical, institutional, and 
political costs of developing such a system may ultimately be high.   
 
Variants of a market-based solution might be used to compensate farmers and perhaps remove 
some inefficiencies in resource use.  Federal or State government, perhaps in conjunction with 
third parties (e.g. environmental interests), might accept competitive bids for contingent water 
leases to meet short-term water needs.  Alternatively, water banks can be developed to serve as a 
market intermediary.  These mechanisms would allow water to move from its lowest-valued use 
when water is most needed for annual in-stream flows or other uses during periods of restricted 
water supplies.  Farmers would thus be compensated for the water supply diverted while 
encouraged to account for the risk of water shortfalls in their production decisions.  These 
mechanisms, however, would entail some of the same institutional hurdles as a full-fledged 
market. 
   20
Final Considerations 
 
Expanding water demands for out-of-stream uses, in combination with enforcement of Federal 
in-stream requirements and other reserved rights, will continue to increase pressures on available 
water resources to meet the demands of all users, particularly during periods of extended or 
severe drought.  Federal water-resource agencies and authorities have, at times, reallocated 
agricultural water supplies to meet Federal water mandates, although the Federal role in 
compensation is unclear.   
 
This paper reports a ‘maximum’ income loss for a hypothetical 20-percent reduction in 
Reclamation water-supply deliveries.  However, in assessing potential losses that might 
conceivably be addressed under a compensation program, two qualifiers must be emphasized.  
First, water-supply restrictions, while potentially severe in a given locality, are likely to 
constitute a small share of total water supplies at the State or region level for any given year.  
Thus, reductions in aggregate water supply at a State-level are likely to fall within the 0-20% 
range under most conditions.  While Federal actions during water-short years could result in 
severe restrictions in irrigation withdrawals in some cases, actual water-supply reductions are apt 
to be localized in nature and would likely constitute a small share of total water supplies across 
the region.  Second, estimated values by water-reduction scenario are likely to substantially 
overstate the actual costs due to production input and output adjustments and other institutional 
measures that could potentially mitigate producer losses.  The degree of producer response will 
depend on a range of factors, including the scale and timing of the water-supply interruption, 
with substantial variability in potential impacts across areas of the West.  The actual level of   21
producer losses is ultimately an empirical issue, and the subject of further investigation under an 
ERS research program with cooperating universities.   
 
This paper reviews a number of policy strategies advanced to mitigate the risk to irrigators of 
reduced water-supply availability.  The discussion considers potential Federal expenditures, the 
extent to which stream flow augmentation might be achieved, and their effectiveness in 
mitigating financial harm to irrigators, among other factors.  Many, if not most, of the policy 
mechanisms would include changes in Federal and State policies, water management institutions 
and infrastructure, as well as attitudes governing water use.   
 
Potential Federal budgetary outlays would vary by policy mechanism depending on the 
geographic coverage of water supply restrictions; water demands by competing uses, which 
translates into the severity and timing of cutbacks; share of the irrigation loss that is 
compensated; degree to which costs are shifted to other water uses (as with power generation in 
a contingent market case); and the value of more efficient resource allocations possible in market 
solutions.  For a given quantity of water, Federal costs are likely to be lowest for contingent 
markets and auctioned tradable bonds, as a portion of the cost is shifted to current water users.  
Costs are likely to be high for buyouts that acquire irrigated land and appurtenant water use 
rights.  Federal costs may range from moderate to high with direct compensation, subsidized 
insurance, allocated tradable bonds, and agricultural water conservation, where compensation 
levels are sometimes influenced by non-economic considerations. 
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The extent to which policy mechanisms could be used to secure water for increased instream 
flow will depend on legal and institutional adjustments.  Mechanisms that rely on individual 
irrigators may be more effective given the flexibility to geographically target key hydrologic 
areas.  Buyouts, contingent markets, and tradable bonds all are readily targeted to limited areas, 
and may utilize price incentives to encourage participation.  Mechanisms such as State water 
banks and national agricultural water conservation initiatives that may not necessarily provide 
water in the needed areas or in specified amounts, may be less effective in meeting local 
reallocation objectives.   
 
Finally, alternative mechanisms differ in their capacity to mitigate financial harm to irrigators.  
Market mechanisms have a clear advantage when measured according to this criterion, since 
exchange does not occur if the compensation is inadequate.  Allocated tradable bonds may also 
effectively offset losses if the allocation process is designed to provide full compensation.  Since 
insurance premiums and auctioned tradable bonds are purchased, irrigators incur expenses, with 
the amount dependent on the level of insurance or auction subsidy.  Direct compensation can 
provide full (or more than full) replacement of lost revenue, depending on the compensation 
levels established by the political process.  Existing catastrophic insurance provides relatively 
little compensation due to the design of the program which limits payments.  Incentives for 
agricultural water conservation may help prevent the need to transfer water, if the field-level 
savings translate to increased streamflow.  However, existing conservation programs do not 
provide compensation when transfers do occur. 
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The extent, value, and local characteristics of irrigated production have important implications 
for framing policy that would compensate losses to producers from restricting access to water 
supplies.  Increasing competition for water—resulting in part from Federal agency actions—will 
most certainly affect the agricultural sector.  Voluntary, market-based mechanisms have the 
potential to provide total compensation at the lowest cost.  However, no clear “winner” emerges 
in an examination of potential policy mechanisms to mitigate the effects of foregone irrigation 
returns.  The preferred suite of mechanisms depends on the evaluation criteria considered, the 
nature of competing water demands, hydrologic conditions that are site-specific, and existing 
water institutions.   24
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